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Abstract
We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the
union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing del-
egates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that
the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates
instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We also provide the necessary and su±cient
condition such that it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing del-
egates and we ¯nd that the e±ciency loss due to strategic delegation may be quite
important.
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473945.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical study of how the option for unions to
delegate the wage bargaining will a®ect the wage outcome andthe incentives for strikes. Up
to now the literature has mainly focused on strategic delegation on behalf of shareholders.
Fershtman and Judd (1987) have addressed the issue of strategic managerial delegation in
the context of oligopolistic industries with Cournot competition (see also Sklivas, 1987).
Regarding strategic union delegation, Jones (1989) has shown that a divergence between
the objectives of union leaders and union members will naturally arise in a democratic
union as part of a rational bargaining strategy. Essentially, the reason is that in many
bargaining situations, commitment can be valuable, and the union members can credibly
commit to a bargaining stance, which they could not otherwise sustain, by delegating
authority to a negotiator whose objectives make this stance an optimal one. More recently,
Conlin and Furusawa (2000) have provided an explanation of why senior union members
may represent the union in contract negotiations with a monopolist. By strategically
delegating contract negotiations to wage-maximizing individuals, the surplus-maximizing
union may be better o® than if surplus-maximizing individuals negotiate the contract.
But these previous studies have considered complete information frameworks so that
strikes, which waste industry resources, cannot occur at equilibrium.1 So, we go beyond
the analysis o®ered in Jones (1989) and Conlin and Furusawa (2000) by developing a
model that enable us to investigate in presence of strategic union delegation how private
information a®ects the wage level and the e±ciency loss due to the strike activity.2
Precisely, we develop a model of wage determination in which both the union and the
¯rm have private information. First, the union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing
delegates or to use wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) who will
negotiate the wage with the employer. Second, the wage bargaining occurs. To describe
the wage bargaining process, we adopt Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-o®er bargaining
model with two-sided incomplete information, which allows the occurrence of strikes at
equilibrium. Finally, the ¯rm chooses its output level to be produced.
As a benchmark we ¯rst consider the complete information situation and we show that,
the weaker the union is, the more likely the union will choose to send wage-maximizing
delegates. The choice of wage-maximizing delegates always increase the wage level and de-
creases the production output (and the employment level) as well as the consumer surplus.
1Strikes data seem to have a signi¯cant impact on the wage-employment relationship for collective
negotiations (see e.g. Kennan and Wilson, 1989).
2See Kennan and Wilson (1989, 1993) for surveys of bargaining models with private information and
their relation to strike data. See Kennan (1986) for a survey of the empirical results on strike activity.
1Once the negotiators have private information, the complete information results are not al-
ways valid. For example, it might be that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing
delegates is greater than the wage outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates. How-
ever, if it is commonly known that union is stronger than the ¯rm and the labor demand
is quite elastic, then we recover the complete information result, namely that the wage
outcome in case of surplus-maximizing delegates is always strictly smaller than the wage
outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates.
Finally, we show that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-
maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We provide the necessary
and su±cient condition such that, even in presence of private information, it is always
optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates. We ¯nd that the strategic
delegation can increase quite substantially the e±ciency loss due to the strike activity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented. Section 3
describes the wage bargaining game and choice of delegates under complete information.
Section 4 is devoted to the wage bargaining with private information. Section 5 o®ers some
predictions regarding the actual strike duration and the e±ciency loss incurred during wage
negotiations. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a market for a single homogenous product, where the demand is given by P =
a ¡ b ¢ Qc, P is the market price, Q is the quantity produced, and c > 0. There is one
¯rm producing the good. Let ¦ denote the pro¯t level. The only variable input is labor.
Technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is normalized in such a way that Q = L,
where L is labor input, and the unit production cost of each ¯rm is the wage W. Thus,
the pro¯t of each ¯rm is given by
¦ = (a ¡b Qc) Q ¡W Q. (1)
The ¯rm belongs to and is controlled by one risk-neutral owner whose objective is to max-
imize pro¯ts. In addition, the ¯rm is unionized, and enters into a closed-shop agreement
with its risk-neutral union. The union objective is to maximize the union surplus:
U = L (W ¡W), (2)
where W is the reservation wage. The wage rate is determined by negotiations between
the ¯rm and the union delegates. Preceding the negotiations, the union may a®ect the ne-
gotiation outcome by selecting delegates whose objective is either to maximize the union's
surplus or to maximize the wage rate.
2We develop a three-stage game. In stage one, the surplus-maximizing union chooses
whether to use surplus-maximizing delegates or to use wage-maximizing delegates (such
as senior union members) who will negotiate the wage with the employer. The objective
of a wage-maximizing delegate is simply V = W ¡ W. In stage two, the wage bargaining
occurs. Finally, in stage three the employer chooses the output level. The model is solved
backwards.
In the last stage of the game, knowing that the wage level (W) has already been








to maximize its pro¯ts. In stage two, the negotiation takes place. We ¯rst consider the
complete information bargaining as a benchmark.
3 The Wage Bargaining with Complete Information
First, we consider the case in which the union sends surplus-maximizing delegates whose
interest is the same as the union's objective. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein's
(1982) alternating-o®er bargaining model. The ¯rm and the union delegates make alter-
natively wage o®ers, with the ¯rm making o®ers in odd-numbered periods and the union
delegate making o®ers in even-numbered periods. The length of each period is ¢. The
negotiation starts in period 0 and ends when one of the negotiators accepts an o®er. No
limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagree-
ment is a possible outcome. The union is assumed to be on strike in every period until
an agreement is reached. Both the ¯rm and the union are assumed to be impatient. The
¯rm and the union delegate have time preferences with constant discount rates rf > 0 and
ru > 0, respectively.3
To capture the notion that the time it takes to come to terms is small relative to
the length of the contract, we assume that the time between periods is very small. This
allows a study of the limiting situations in which the bargaining procedure is essentially
symmetric and the potential costs of delaying agreement by one period can be regarded
3Two versions of Rubinstein alternating-o®er bargaining model capture di®erent motives that induce
parties to reach an agreement rather than to insist inde¯nitely on incompatible demands. In a ¯rst version
the parties' incentive to agree lies in the fact that they are impatient : player i is indi®erent between
receiving x ¢ exp(¡ri ¢ ¢) today and x tomorrow, where ri > 0 is player i's discount rate. In a second
version the parties are not impatient but they face a risk that if agreement is delayed then the opportunity
they hope to exploit jointly may be lost : player i believes that at the end of each bargaining period there
is a positive probability 1¡exp(¡ri¢) that the process will break down, ri > 0. So, ri can be interpreted
either as player i's discount rate or as his estimate about the probability of a breakdown of the negotiations.
3as negligible. As the interval between o®ers and countero®ers is short and shrinks to
zero, the alternating-o®er model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium, which
approximates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore et al.,











where the lowerscript "s" means that wage bargaining is between the ¯rm and surplus-
maximizing union delegates, and where U0 = 0 and ¦0 = 0 are, respectively, the disagree-
ment payo®s of the union delegate and the ¯rm. The parameter ® 2 (0;1) is the union
bargaining power which is equal to
rf
ru+rf. Simple computation gives us
WSPE
s = W +®
c
1 + c





(a ¡ W). (5)
Obviously, the wage is increasing with the reservation wage W, with the union bargain-












as well as the union's payo® and the ¯rm's pro¯t, which are denoted U¤
s (®) and ¦¤
s(®),



























Second, we consider the case in which the union sends wage-maximizing delegates.











where the lowerscript "w" means that wage bargaining is between the ¯rm and wage-
maximizing union delegates, and where V 0 = 0 and ¦0 = 0 are, respectively, the disagree-
ment payo®s of the union delegate and the ¯rm. The parameter ® 2 (0;1) is still the
union bargaining power which is equal to
rf
ru+rf.4 Simple computation gives us
WSPE
w = W + ®
c
1 ¡® + c
(a ¡ W) = W +
c rf
(1 +c) ru +c rf
(a ¡ W). (10)
4It is assumed that all union members have the same discount rate. The workers only di®er with respect
to their seniority within the ¯rm (senior workers who are almost insulated from the threat of job loss) or
if they are union delegates who are protected by law from being dismissed. So, the choice of the union is
either to send a negotiator who will represent the entire workforce or to send a senior worker (or a union
delegate). Involuntary lay-o®s are typically done by inverse seniority within the plant or ¯rm, the so called
last in, ¯rst out (see Carruth and Oswald, 1989).
4Again, the wage is increasing with the reservation wage W, with the union bargaining












as well as the union's payo® and the ¯rm's pro¯t, which are denoted U¤
w(®) and ¦¤
w(®),
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A natural question to ask at this point is whether union delegation reduces consumer

























for the case in which the union sends wage-maximizing delegates. Comparing both ex-
pressions yields that the consumer surplus is always lower when the union sends wage-
maximizing delegates rather than surplus-maximizing delegates.
In the ¯rst stage of the game, the union chooses whether to use surplus-maximizing del-
egates or wage-maximizing delegates to negotiate the wage with the employer. Comparing
(7) with (12) we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The union will send wage-maximizing delegates if and only if
(1 + c)
c+2(1 ¡®) ¸ (1 ¡ ® +c)c+1(1 +c ¡®c):
Proposition 1 tells us that: (i) for any given union bargaining power ® 2 (0;1), the
more inelastic the product demand is (i.e. c is big), the more likely the union will choose
to send wage-maximizing delegates; (ii) for any given degree of elasticity of the demand,
the weaker the union is (i.e. ® is small), the more likely the union will choose to send
wage-maximizing delegates. Indeed, as c increases the more inelastic the product and
labor demands become, and so even strong unions are more likely to send wage-maximizing
5delegates. In case the product demand is linear, c = 1, the union will choose to send wage-
maximizing delegates if and only if 8(1¡®) ¸ (2¡®)3. That is, the union will choose to
send wage-maximizing delegates if and only if the union bargaining power is less or equal
than ®¤ ' :76. So, if the union is relatively not too strong, then the union will delegate
the negotiation task to wage-maximizing delegates. This result advocates that care will be
needed in the interpretation of econometric estimates of trade unions objectives done in
the past since these estimates did not distinguish between the objective of the trade union
and the objective of the union delegate who actually negotiated.5 For example, Dertouzos
and Pencavel's (1981) original analysis of the International Typographical Union (ITU)
for the years 1946 to 1965 was to discriminate between popular alternative hypotheses
about union objectives. The results they obtained support considerable diversity in union
objectives among ITU locals. In regards with our analysis, their conclusion should be
taken cautiously. Indeed, it could have been that ITU locals had the same objective but
decided to send delegates who had di®erent objectives.
However, both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the Rubinstein's model
predict e±cient outcomes of the bargaining process (in particular agreement is reached
immediately). This is not the case once we introduce incomplete information into the wage
bargaining, in which the ¯rst rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission
between the two negotiators.
4 The Wage Bargaining with Private Information
The main feature of the negotiation is that both negotiators have private information.
Each negotiator does not know the impatience (or discount rate) of the other party. It










u. The superscripts "I" and "P" identify the most impatient and most patient
types, respectively. The types are independently drawn from the set [rP
i ;rI
i] according to
the probability distribution pi, for i =u,f. We allow for general distributions over discount
rates. This uncertainty implies bounds on the union bargaining power which are denoted















Lemma 1 Consider the wage bargaining with incomplete information in which the distrib-
utions pf and pu are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks to zero. For
any perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE), the payo® of the union belongs to [U¤
¢ (®);U¤
¢ (®)]
and the payo® of the ¯rm belongs to [¦¤
¢ (®);¦¤
¢ (®)].
5See Pencavel (1991) for a survey of the empirical results on trade union objectives.
6This lemma follows from Watson's (1998) analysis of Rubinstein's alternating-o®er
bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information.6 Lemma 1 is not a direct corol-
lary to Watson (1998) Theorem 1 because Watson's work focuses on linear preferences,
but the analysis can be modi¯ed to handle the present case. Translating Watson (1998)
Theorem 2 to our framework completes the characterization of the PBE payo®s.
Lemma 2 Consider the wage bargaining with incomplete information in which the period
length shrinks to zero. For any e U 2 [U¤
¢ (®);U¤
¢ (®)], e ¦ 2 [¦¤
¢ (®);¦¤
¢(®)], there exists
distributions pu and pf, and a PBE such that the PBE payo®s are e U and e ¦.
In other words, whether or not all payo®s within the intervals given in Lemma 1 are
possible depends on the distributions over types. As Watson (1998) stated, Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 establish that "each player will be no worse than he would be in equilibrium
if it were common knowledge that he were his least patient type and the opponent were
his most patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no better than he would be in
equilibrium with the roles reversed". From Lemma 1 we have that the PBE wage outcome
in case of the union chooses to send surplus-maximizing delegates, W¤










(a ¡ W) · W ¤









Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appropri-
ately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of the
complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the union's type is rI
u
(rP
u) and the ¯rm's type is rP
f (rI
f) (and the union bargaining power is ® (®)). Expression
(16) implies bounds on the ¯rm's employment level, as well as on the ¯rm's output, at
equilibrium. In case of the union chooses to send wage-maximizing delegates, the PBE
wage outcome, W¤







(a ¡W) · W¤






(a ¡ W). (17)
With complete information, the choice of wage-maximizing delegates always increase
the wage level and decreases the production output (and the employment level) as well
6Watson (1998) characterized the set of PBE payo®s which may arise in Rubinstein's alternating-o®er
bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are met) on the agreements that may be made. The
bounds and the PBE payo®s set are determined by the range of incomplete information and are easy to
compute because they correspond to the SPE payo®s of two bargaining games of complete information.
These two games are de¯ned by matching one player's most impatient type with the opponent's most
patient type.
7as the consumer surplus. But when the players possess private information, the complete
information results are not always valid. The necessary and su±cient condition to recover
the complete information result that the wage outcome in case of surplus-maximizing
















This condition is satis¯ed the smaller the amount of private information j® ¡®j and the
parameter c are. So, the more elastic the product demand is the more likely the wage
outcome in case of wage-maximizing delegates will be higher than the wage outcome in case
of surplus-maximizing delegates even in presence of incomplete information. The condition
(18) can be rewritten as ®(1+c) > ®(1¡®+c). Hence, if it is commonly known that union
is stronger than the ¯rm (® ¸ :5) and the labor demand is quite elastic (c · 1), then we
get W¤
w(®;®) > W ¤
s (®;®), CSw(®;®) < CSs(®;®) and L¤
w(®;®) < L¤
s(®;®). The intuition
behind this result is the following one. Firstly, incomplete information in the model takes
into account two main features. The ¯rst one is the amount of private information in
possession of the players. By the amount of private information we mean the size of the
set in which player's discount rate is contained and which is common knowledge between
the players. The second one is the uncertainty about who is the more patient player, i.e.
who is the stronger player. When it is common knowledge that the union is stronger,
this second feature disappears, and information tends to play a less crucial role in the
process of the negotiation between the ¯rm and the union delegates. Secondly, if the
elasticity of product and labor demands is high, a wage increase will imply a signi¯cant
drop in employment level and, hence, it will refrain surplus-maximizing delegates from
demanding high wages. Therefore, we recover the above complete information results
once it is common knowledge that the union is stronger than the ¯rm and the elasticity of
product and labor demands is high enough. The next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 If it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the ¯rm (® ¸ 1
2)
and the labor demand is quite elastic (c · 1), then W¤
w(®;®) > W ¤
s (®;®).
Obviously, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 ine±cient outcomes are possible, even as the
period length shrinks to zero. Ine±ciency can occur in two ways. First, players might agree
to throw away some of the resource over which they are bargaining, even when agreement
is reached without delay. Second, the negotiation may involve considerable delay, even if
the eventual agreement is e±cient on its own. While the scope of possible ine±ciency is
clear from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, what is not so obvious is the potential for delay. In
fact, the wage bargaining game may involve delay (strikes or lock-outs), but not perpetual
8disagreement, at equilibrium. Indeed, Watson (1998) has constructed a bound on delay in
equilibrium which shows that an agreement is reached in ¯nite time and that delay time
equals zero as incomplete information vanishes.
5 The Strike Activity
In the literature on strikes [see e.g. Cheung and Davidson (1991), Kennan and Wilson
(1989, 1993)], three di®erent measures of strike activity are usually proposed: the strike
incidence, the strike duration, and the number of work days lost due to work stoppages.
Since we allow for general distributions over types and we may encounter a multiplicity
of PBE, we are unable to compute measures of strike activity as the ones just mentioned.
In order to compute an expected strike duration one would need to ¯x some parameters
of the model such as the distribution over types but it would imply a substantial loss of
generality. Nevertheless, we propose to identify the strike activity (strikes or lock-outs)
with the potential ine±ciency in reaching a wage agreement. Following Watson (1998)
Theorem 3, the larger is the di®erence between the upper bound and lower bound on the
bargaining outcome, the larger is the potential ine±ciency for obtaining an agreement
and the larger is the possibility of delay in reaching an agreement. Therefore, the strike
activity is given by the di®erence between the upper bound and the lower bound on the
wage outcome and it can be interpreted as an indicator of both the level of potential
ine±ciency and the strike duration.7
When the union chooses surplus-maximizing delegates to bargain the wage with the
¯rm, the strike activity is given by the following expression.
































Therefore, ªs is an increasing (decreasing) function of rI
u (rP
u), is a decreasing (increasing)
function of rP
f (rI
f), and is decreasing with the reservation wage W. We observe also
that the strike activity is decreasing with the degree of elasticity of the product demand:
@ªs
@c > 0. That is, the more inelastic the demand is the more strikes will occur.
When the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates to bargain the wage with the ¯rm,
7Our measure of strike activity gives the scope each player has for screening his opponent by making
wage proposals satisfying the expressions (16) or (17), and hence, for delaying the wage agreement. Only
in average this measure is a good proxy of actual strike duration.
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Again, ªw is an increasing (decreasing) function of rI
u (rP
u), is a decreasing (increasing)
function of rP
f (rI
f), and is decreasing with the reservation wage W. But now the strike
activity might be decreasing or increasing with the degree of elasticity of the product
demand. Precisely, the strike activity is decreasing with the degree of elasticity of the
product demand, @ªw




f. So, we can state the
following results: (i) if it is common knowledge that the union is weaker than the ¯rm
then @ªw






the union then @ªw
@c < 0.
From both expressions of strike activity we observe that, for any given amount of
private information j® ¡®j the stronger the union might be (i.e. the bigger ® is) the
greater the strike activity will be. This result is con¯rmed by Tracy (1986) empirical
study of the determinants of U.S. labor disputes. He found that the higher the union
coverage rate (which is a proxy for the union bargaining power) is, the more likely strikes
will occur and last. Moreover, comparing the expressions (19) and (21) we can state the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 The strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing
delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. That is, ªw > ªs.
Whether strategic union delegation will increase or decrease the strike activity is not
obvious at ¯rst sight. The wage objective of surplus-maximizing delegates (who do care
about output levels) is not clear-cut as it is for the wage objective of wage-maximizing
delegates (who do not care about ¯rm's output). Hence, surplus-maximizing delegates
have more scope to hide their type, which is private information, in order to try to reach
a more favorable outcome. As a consequence, the ¯rm who still claims lower wages may
need more time, during the negotiation, to screen the union's type when bargaining occurs
with surplus-maximizing delegates rather than with wage-maximizing delegates. But this
e®ect is in fact dominated by the con°ict of interest which is so strong between the ¯rm
and the wage-maximizing delegates and which induces the wage-maximizing delegates to
concede more slowly than surplus-maximizing delegates do.
From Proposition 3 we know that if the union chooses to send wage-maximizing del-
egates then the strike activity is going to increase. Now we turn to investigate whether
10and when it is optimal to delegate for the union. The necessary and su±cient condition























From (24) we can make the following two remarks. First, if it is commonly known that the
union is weaker than the ¯rm (i.e. ® · 1
2) and the union is not too weak (i.e. ® ¸ 2
5) then
it is optimal for the union to send wage-maximizing delegates. Second, if it is commonly
known that the union is stronger than the ¯rm (i.e. ® ¸ 1
2) and the union is not too
strong (i.e. ® · 13
20) then it is optimal for the union to send wage-maximizing delegates.
Finally, notice that the increase in strike activity due to strategic delegation may be far
from being negligible. For example, if ® = 1
2 and ® = 2
5 then allowing strategic union
delegation will increase at equilibrium the strike activity by 66%. Even more, if ® = 1
2
and ® = 13
20 then strategic union delegation will increase the strike activity by 100%. As a
measure of the e±ciency loss due to strategic delegation we propose the ratio between the
strike activity in case the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates and the strike activity






(1 ¡® +c)(1 ¡® +c)
(25)
This ratio is bounded above by (1+c
c )2 and below by 1 (cfr. Proposition 3). So, by
giving the option to the union to delegate, the strike activity and the ine±ciency loss can
increase considerably. Indeed, the strike activity with wage-maximizing delegates can be
up to
(1+c)2
c("+c) times the strike activity with surplus-maximizing delegates with " small. For
example, if the demand is linear (c = 1) then this ratio will be close to 4 which is not
negligible.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model of wage determination with private information, in which
the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing
delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We have shown
that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates
instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We have also determined when it is always
optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates and we have found that the
11e±ciency loss due to strategic delegation can be important. From a policy perspective our
analysis questions whether one should allow for strategic delegation (for example, by means
of laws protecting union delegates from being dismissed). From a research perspective
our analysis questions theoretical results obtained under complete information as well as
empirical studies of the trade union objectives. A direction for future research is to test
empirically the relevance of strategic union delegation and to overcome the identi¯cation
problem with respect to the trade union objective and the negotiator objective.
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